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Abstract
The effect of labour costs on industry profits, employment and labour income is at the heart of
the current European debate on industry competitiveness. High wages paid in European
countries such as Germany are generally considered harmful for industry profitability.
Though, high wages appear also to be associated with high labour skills and then with
superior product quality. Similarly, a reduction in labour taxes is often invoked as a tool to
improve industry profitability, but this argument hardly takes into account the demand effects
of such a tax reform. In this paper we analyse the trade-off between labour costs and industry
profits by means of a simple general equilibrium model where one industry is oligopolistic
and vertically differentiated. The manufacturing of products of a higher quality requires the
employment of a larger amount of skilled labour. Given an underlying skills distribution, the
model determines profits, wages and aggregate income and welfare. Results show that high
net wages due to a low skills endowment in the economy are typically associated with low
profits. Labour taxation unambiguously raises gross wages, but has little effect on net wages.
Depending on how the tax revenue is redistributed, higher taxation may either depress or
boost industry profits.
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1. Introduction

The effect of labour cost on industry profits, employment and labour income is at the heart of
the current European debate on industry competitiveness. Some argue that the high wages
paid in European countries such as Gennany harm the profitability of industries and will
possibly lead to emigration of firms. Others maintain that the observed high wages are
coupled with high workers' skills and then with high labour productivity and superior product
quality, so that the cost of labour cannot be the only factor to look at when analysing finns'
performance and locational incentives. Concerning labour taxation, it is a widespread opinion
that too high tax wedges aggravate the competitive problems of the European industry and,
consistently, many observers invoke for a reduction of tax rates on labour costs. Such an
argument, though, does not take into account the distributional consequences of tax reforms,
and the possible repercussions for demand and profitability of particular industries.
In general, the average wage paid in the manufacturing industry or the level of labour taxes
can hardly be thought as sufficient statistics to assess the effects of labour costs on the
performance of given industries. High wages keep finns' costs high, but also stimulate the
supply of skilled labour. High labour taxation may involve a positive demand feedback that
offsets the negative direct effect on costs for some industries. Analysing the effects of labour
costs on industry performance requires then taking into account general equilibrium effects
that are commonly disregarded in current policy debate.

Standard general equilibrium analysis is cast in a perfectly competitive framework, thus
neglecting important features of modern industries. Giant corporations are hardly price-takers.
Competition in technologically-advanced sectors does not only take place in prices, but also in
all those factors that affect the level of product quality perceived by consumers (R&D,
advertisement...). The profits accruing to some industries are a non-negligible part of national
income and, from a dynamic perspective, they form the incentives for investment and
innovation. Perfectly competitive models miss also important aspects of current trade flows
among developed countries. A large and increasing share of modern international trade takes
place in differentiated goods belonging to the same sector, but perfect competition is not
consistent with the observed firms' incentives to differentiate their products. Hence, a useful
model to analyse the effects of labour conditions on industry performance should be a general
equilibrium one, but it should also incorporate imperfectly competitive features that are
commonly disregarded in standard models.
In this paper we develop a simple general equilibrium model to analyse the relation between
some features of the labour market and the performance of a vertically differentiated,
oligopolistic industry.
There are several reasons that lead us to focus on vertical
differentiation. First, vertical differentiation models permit us to capture a crucial dimension
of the competitiveness of advanced industries, namely, product quality, allowing for a
convenient modelling of quality competition. Second, recent empirical evidence shows that
vertical differentiation is at the heart of current developments of intra-European trade.
European intra-industry trade (lIT) in vertically differentiated goods has increased
significantly during the last decade, while lIT in horizontally differentiated varieties has been
stagnating.! Empirical evidence also shows that differences in factor endowments are
positively related with the share of lIT in vertically differentiated goods across European
countries. 2 This leads to the presumption that the determinants of competitiveness in
vertically differentiated industries are to be studied in a general equilibrium framework,

1 See e.g. Fontagne et. al. (1995), Fontagne et. al. (1997).
2See Fontagne et al. (1997).
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something that is missing in standard imperfectly competitive models (e.g., Gabszewicz and
Thisse, 1979, Shaked and Sutton, 1982).
Empirical research indicates that the availability of skilled labour within a country influences
the level of product qualities and the resulting international competitive position of domestic
industries. 3 Consistently, we assume in our model that producing higher quality products
requires a higher amount of skilled labour. In order to analyse currently debated issues
concerning labour taxation we also allow for the presence of taxes on labour and the
redistribution of resulting revenues to consumers by the government. Firms in the vertically
differentiated sector are oligopolistic and decide about prices and product qualities in a twostage industry game. Given an underlying skills distribution, the model determines the
allocation of labour, the distribution of income, as well as the quality and prices of the goods
produced in the oligopolistic sector. In such a framework, contrary to standard models of
vertically differentiated oligopolies, firms' demand functions can only be determined at
equilibrium, together with labour allocation and consumers' income. Therefore, firms'
conjectures about their own demand functions when setting prices and product qualities must
prove to be consistent with equilibrium values, a requirement that is absent in partial
equilibrium models. Because of non-linearities, an explicit solution of the model is not
possible, and simulations are necessary.
The model is used to examine the effects of changes in the endowment of labour skills and in
non-wage labour costs on firms' prices, product qualities, profits, income and overall welfare.
Results show that higher net wages due to a low skills endowment in the economy is typically
coupled with lower industry competitiveness (measured by the price-quality ratio), profits, and
overall welfare. A reduction in labour taxes unambiguously lowers gross wages, but has little
effect on net wages. It may either increase or decrease industry profitability, depending on the
redistributive income effect of taxation. If tax revenues were fully retained by the government
before the tax reform, the positive cost effect related to a tax-cut tends to prevail, creating an
advantage to the domestic industry. However, if tax revenues were previously fully
redistributed, a negative demand effect offsets the cost effect, leading to reduced industry
profits and welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the model, and
presents its main analytical properties. Section 3 reviews and discusses the results of the
simulations. Section 4 concludes.

2. A General Equilibrium Model with Vertically Differentiated Product
Qualities, Skills, and Incomes.
The existing literature dealing with vertical product differentiation has focused on the strategic
determinants of industry equilibrium. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) characterise the pricesetting behaviour of a duopoly at given qualities and zero marginal costs, showing how "limitpricing" strategies may endogenously arise, leading to the exclusion of the low-quality
competitor. This result is the basis for the so-called "finiteness property" of vertically
differentiated oligopolies, illustrated by Shaked and Sutton (1984). Holding fixed costs
constant, the number of active firms in a differentiated industry may not increase even with
increasing market size and free-entry, because price strategies adjust in such a way as not to
3 Daly et. al. (1985), Steedman and Wagner (1987) or Mason et. al. (1996) present cross country evidence that
endowments with vocational skills tend to affect quality levels in several national industries. Courakis (1991),
Webster (1993), Oulton (1996), Torstensson (1996), Jansen (1997) present results indicating that countries with
high endowments in skills trade high qualities in intra-industry trade.
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allow pOSItIve market shares for potential entrants. Sutton (1991) also shows, with the
support of a large set of empirical industry studies, that an endogenous markets structure is
likely to arise in vertically differentiated industries because firms build their own entry
barriers, increasing the quality level of their goods (and the necessary sunk investments) as
market size increases.
While the literature on vertical differentiation under oligopoly has fully developed the demand
implications of a rankable product structure, showing how this may be sufficient "per-se" to
generate industry concentration, the supply side of the story has so far been neglected.
Oligopolistic models with vertical differentiation are indeed developed in a partial equilibrium
framework, assuming an exogenous cost structure. 4 In particular, what is missing in
theoretical work is the channel linking factor endowments to product quality.

In this section we develop a model where the supply factors necessary to provide higher
product quality in an oligopolistic industry are explicitly taken into account. We assume that
the manufacturing of higher quality goods requires a more intense use of skilled labour. 5 This
is consistent with empirical evidence (Daly et. aI., 1985, Mason et aI., 1996), and in line with
recently proposed trade models incorporating vertically differentiated as well as perfectly
competitive industries (Copeland and Kotwal, 1996, Murphy and Shleifer, 1997). The supply
of skilled labour within a country is then the factor limiting the quality level of the goods
produced domestically. The qualities chosen by domestic firms determine demand for skilled
labour, and then skilled workers' income, which, in tum, generates firms' demands. Clearly,
incorporating supply determinants of quality into the analysis of a vertically differentiated
market necessitates usage of a full-fledged general-equilibrium model in order to take into
account the feedback from costs to demand. It is exactly this link between demand and costs
that we want to highlight in our model.
We opt for the most parsimonious model capable of capturing the effects generated by the
interaction between an imperfectly competitive, vertically differentiated product market and a
vertically differentiated, though perfectly competitive labour market. An "outside", perfectly
competitive industry also enters the picture, in order to capture competition in both product
and labour markets between industries.
The oligopolistic industry (henceforth, the x-sector) is modelled borrowing from the standard
approach of vertical product differentiation in partial equilibrium (Gabszewicz and Thisse
1979, Shaked and Sutton 1982, Motta 1993). Consumers have identical preferences and
different incomes. Differences in income lead to differences in the willingness to pay for a
product of a particular quality. Firms offer products of different qualities in one (domestic)
market. The firms bear quality-dependent costs and compete in qualities and prices in a twostage game. Since higher product differentiation reduces substitutability between variants
supplied by different firms, even ex-ante identical firms will offer distinct qualities in the
resulting market equilibrium in order to "reduce price-competition through product
differentiation." .
Both sectors use the only production factor: labour. Workers, though, are not homogenous.
Each worker is endowed with a unique level of skills and a certain amount of unskilled labor;
due to a time or capacity constraint, any worker can either utilize his skill or his unskilled
labour, but not both together. As for the competitive industry (henceforth, the z-sector), it
faces a technology with constant returns to scale. One unit of the good produced requires a
4 Among the very few exceptions, see Katsoulacos (1984).
5See also Gabszewicz and Tunini (1999) for an oligopolistic model where the employment of a higher fraction of
skilled labour allows firms to supply higher quality goods.
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constant amount of unskilled labour input, regardless of the skill level of the workers
employed. The oligopolistc industry, instead. faces increasing returns to scale. The
manufacturing of a product of a given quality, requires a certain amount of skilled labour as an
input, independent of the produced quantity.6 We further assume that the quality developed is
increasing in the mass of skilled labour employed. Once a product of certain quality is
developed, it is produced at constant variable cost. In the analysis we assume this marginal
cost to be zero, as it is done in partial equilibrium models (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979,
Motta, 1993). This assumption is highly useful in that it simplifies the determination of quality
levels when they are strategically set by finns in a two-stage game, allowing for explicit
solutions in a partial equilibrium framework (Motta, 1993). In our analysis, this assumption
has also another important implication. While the competitive industry offers a wage per
unskilled labour unit effectively tying wage to marginal cost, workers in the x-sector are paid
in proportion to skills, tying wage to fixed cost'? Therefore, the ratio of the wage paid in the x
and in the z sector uniquely determines the allocation of labour between the two industries.
We also allow the government to levy a proportional tax on labor for fiscal or redistributive
purposes; the resulting tax revenue can be either retained or redistributed to households. While
in the z-sector taxes are completely transferred on to the consumer, in the x-sector, they may
be partially paid by workers in terms of lower equilibrium wages and by shareholders in terms
of lower profits.
Labour supply is rigid for each household. Income distribution is determined by the
distribution of skills, the distribution of unskilled labour, the distribution of claims to firms'
profits, the allocation of labour between sectors, and a rule for distributing tax revenue.
Income distribution determines in turn the allocation of demand between industries and
between firms within the x-sector.
A first characterization for the general equilibrium of an economy with imperfectly
competitive firms is found in Negishi (1961).8 Under the assumption of constant returns to
scale in production, Negishi (1961) proves existence of a price vector under which markets
clear, monopolistic firms maximize profits, and firms' conjectures concerning their demand
functions are consistent. 9 Wheareas under partial equilibrium the demand function is a given
for imperfectly competitive firms, under general equilibrium, demand functions are
determined at equilibrium as well. Hence, the additional requirement concerning consistency
of firms' conjectures about demand functions is also necessary in our model for the
characterization of equilibrium.

2.1. Vertical Product Differentiation: The x-sector
Both theoretical literature and empirical evidence show that the number of firms tends to be
low in industries characterised by vertical product differentiation. 1O We therefore limit the

6Empirical evidence concerning the detenninants of IIT in vertically differentiated industries is consistent with the
assumption of the existence of relevant scale economies in the production of vertically differentiated goods
(Fontagne et aL, 1997).
7 Costs are marginal or fixed with respect to quantity produced. So the "fixed" costs of the x-sector change when
quality produced is changed, but not in response to pure quantity changes in output.
8 A different approach to generaJ equilibrium under imperfect competition is offered in Gabszewicz and Vial
(1972). See Hart (1985) for a survey on the topic.
9ln Negishi (1961), firms are assumed to take in to account the income effects originating from their actions when
conjecturing demand functions. As will be clear in the folllowing of the paper, in our approach income effects are
neglected by firms.
lOSee, e.g., Sulton (1991).
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analysis to the duopoly case, gaining in model tractability, without losing too much in tenns of
generality and realism. From the assumption of Bertrand competition in the second stage, we
know that the two finns will never select the same quality level at a first stage equilibrium. It
is then possible to denote by h the finn supplying the good of higher quality, and by i the finn
supplying the lower quality. I I If both finns remain in the market, then they produce distinct
goods, sold at prices Ph and PI' respectively. The two products carry a single quality attribute
denoted by u h and u/' respectively. Either firm faces fixed production costs that are increasing
functions of quality. We further assume that fixed costs are quadratic in the quality level (see,
e.g., Motta, 1993 and Lutz, 1996). This corresponds to assuming that there are decreasing
returns in quality design. The quality level supplied by finn i, i=h, i, increases in fact with the
square root of the mass of skills (or, the effective labour units) employed, eli:
i

=h,i

(1)

Denoting total costs for finn i, i=h, i, by C;, the wage rate per unit of skill in the x-sector by
wx, the fiscal wedge by (1 +t), and recalling that variable costs are set to zero, we have:
i

= h,i

(2)

Skills are unifonnly distributed, with density d, on the interval [0, S] on which households 12
(indexed by s) are ranked according to their skill level. Unskilled labour endowments ms are
weakly monotonically increasing in skills endowments. l3 Households are unifonnly
distributed on [0, S] with density l. l4 Households derive utility from consumption of the
outside good z (produced in the competitive z-sector) and one variety, at the exclusion of the
other, of the quality good x. Then, each consumer (household) purchases at most one unit of
either finn h's product or finn 1's product and spends the rest of her (his) income to buy some
quantity of the outside good z. Income of each household s, Ys' contains a share of total
profits in the x-sector, ITs and a share of the tax revenue t s' The higher a consumer's income,
the higher is her (his) reservation price (ceteris paribus). In order to have a monotonic relation
between households' income and skill level, we assume in the following that profits and tax
revenue are redistributed in such a way to guarantee Ys' ~ Ys <=> s'~ s. Let Si (i = h, 1) be the
poorest consumer who buys one unit of good x supplied by finn i. Then the demands for the
two firms supplying good x take the following form:
(3)

I I Quality differentiation will emerge as the result of quality competition in the first stage of the industry game.
See Shaked/Sutton (1982).
12 We assume single-person households, acting as consumers and workers.
13 Each worker s has an unskilled labour endowment of ms=(mo+ms) units of good z. where ma. m are parameters
of the distribution of unskilled labour. With mo= 1 and m=O, each household s has the same unit unskilled labour
endowment. Due to a time or capacity constraint, any worker can either utilise his skill or his unskilled labour,
but not both together.
14 A unifonn distribution of skills does not have an empirical justification, but is desirable for its tractability. For
this reason unifonn distributions are common in vertical differentiation models. In our setting, the mass of
households is equal to S and each household is endowed with skills ds The total mass of skills in the economy is

&2

&

2

2

thus equal to - - , while the average per-capita skill is given by - . Varying d modifies proportionally the
supply of skills and the average skills level, widening also the variance of skills across the population.
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The two fInns play a two-stage industry game. In the fIrst stage, fInns simultaneously
detennine qualities to be produced and incur costs C j (i = h, l). In the second stage, fInns
choose prices (Bertrand competition). Labour allocation (between sectors and finns) and
wage determination take place in the first stage of the game, while consumption occurs in the
second stage.

2.1.1. Utility and Demand

Explicit derivation of fInns' demand requires a parametric representation of preferences. For
simplicity, and in analogy with existing work (e.g., Copeland (1997), Murphy and Shleifer
(1997», we assume that the consumption level of the homogenous good z and the quality level
of the differentiated good x enter the utility of each consumer s by means of a Cobb-Douglas
aggregator:
Us

= (Us + Uo) a ql,s'
I-a

S

E

[O,S]

(4)

where Us denotes the quality of the x-good consumed by household sand ql.,S the quantity of
the z-good. uo, Uo >0, is a parameter representing the utility level obtained when not buying
good x. As usual, O<a<l.
Consumers take as given quality levels and prices for the variants hand 1. Denote,
respectively, by U. (h). U. (1) and Us the utility levels reached at equilibrium by household s
when buying one unit of variant h, one unit of variant 1and when not buying at all good x. The
poorest household willing to buy the higher quality variant, Sh, satisfies with equality the
condition Us (h) ~ Us (1); analogously, household s/ satisfies with equality Us (1)? U• . These
cut-off individuals can be characterised in tenns of their income, YS' once their budget
constraint is substituted into their utility function (recall that all residual income after the
purchase of good x is spent in good z). Income of households Sh and S/ are, respectively, given
by:
a

a

Y~

-(u
+U )I-a PI
=(U
o +Uh )l-a Ph
OI
-

a

(UO+ Uh) I-a

Ys/

= max

(U

Ys=O'

[

-

o + UI )

-a
(UO+ UI) I-a

a]

I-a PI

a
a
(UO+UI)l-a _(Uo)l-a

(5)

(6)

The cut-off income level for the individual indifferent between buying quality 1and not buying
cannot be lower than the income of the least skilled individual, namely, individual 0. If it

+U

(U

)

.:a P

]

~
I....!:... = Ys=O' then all households are willing to
[
(U O+UI)I-a _(u o )l-a
purchase one unit of the x-good, namely, the market is said to be covered. 15

happens that max Y.=O'

0

15In our analysis we focus on the case where the market is uncovered.

.

I

7

From the definition of income, and denoting by t Sj the amount of tax revenue redistributed to
the cut-off household
is obtained that:

Si ,

and by w.. and w t ' respectively, the wage rate in the x and z-sector, it

i

= h,l

(7)

if the cut-off household i is working in the x-sector, or
i

= h,l

(8)

if household i is working in the z-sector.
It is to notice that equations (5)-(6) and (7)-(8) are not sufficient to determine firms' demands
as functions prices and qualities. In fact, income levels YSh and YS are endogenous to the
j

model, being affected by the level of W s and by the distribution of profits and tax revenue. So,
contrary to the standard vertical differentiation modds developed in partial equilibrium, the
exact form of the demand function can only be determined once the full solution of the model
is obtained. This means that after obtaining the full solution of the model the consistency of
the assumed demand expressions for each firm has to be checked. 16

2.1.2. Quality and price determination
Firms choose simultaneously the quality level of their product in the first stage and
simultaneously set prices in the second stage 17 . Then, when setting prices, firms take qualities
as given. It is further assumed that finns take as given households' income both in the quality
and price-setting stage. Firms are therefore not aware of the repercussions that their actions
have on income distribution, and then on their own demand. In other terms, we ignore "Ford"
effects", maintaining the standard assumption that firms, though strategic, neglect the
feedback to their demand coming from changes in consumers' revenue. 18 Firms, in any case,
have to make conjectures on demand and then on households' income, which must prove to be
correct at equilibrium.
Profit maximisation with respect to prices yields the following system of first order
conditions:
(9)

where

~~

iJ=h,l denotes partial derivatives. As for quality determination, first order

conditions are as follows:

16Firstly, it needs to be verified that resulting quantities demanded are consistent with the (un)covered market
asswnption. Secondly, depending on whether low quality is bought by workers in the x-industry or not, equation
(5) has to be equalised with either equation (7) or (8), respectively.
17In this formulation, firm i not entering the market is equivalent to firm i choosing ui O. The entry decision by
firms is made simultaneously when choosing quality.
18It is well-known that keeping wages of his workers high has been an explicit strategy through which Ford was
keeping demand for his own cars high. For a general equilibrium model with Ford effects we refer the interested
reader to D' Aspremont et aI. (1989)

=
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(10)
where

1rj

denotes operating profits of finns i computed at a pair of prices that is the solution to

(9) and d1rj denotes total derivatives at given incomes.
dU j
Equilibrium in the industry is determined by a pair of prices that are mutual best replies in the
second stage, a pair of quality levels that are mutual best replies in the first stage, and by a
couple of conjectures concerning consumers' income that are consistent with actual values.
This last condition derives from the general equilibrium framework in which the model is
cast, and is absent in traditional models of vertical product differentiation. In the following we
will make the assumption that finns know the rule according to which profits and the tax
revenue are distributed among households. Wages (and then total tax revenue) are determined
simultaneously with qualities, and are therefore taken as given by finns in the quality setting
stage. x-sector profits are instead the finns' objective function in the quality-setting stage, and
cannot be taken as given by firms. Yet, when deciding about their qualities, firms also need to
make a conjecture about total profits, because they determine consumers' income, and then
their own demand. So, in this set-up, making conjectures on consumers' income means
making conjectures on aggregate profits in the x-sector.
Conjectured demands for each firm are obtained once incomes of the cut-off consumers are
conjectured. Denoting by a hat conjectured variables and by a,., and f3. , ' respectively, the
share of total profits (II) and total tax revenue (T) accruing to the cut-off consumer Si
conjectured incomes for cut-off consumers are obtained as:
i

= h,i

(11)

if the cut-off consumer Sj is employed in the x-sector, and
i = h,i

(12)

if the cut-off consumer is working in the z-sector.
2.2. The Homogenous "Outside" Good: The Z-Sector
This sector is perfectly competitive. A large number of finns produces a homogenous good z
with a constant returns to scale technology, using one unit of unskilled labour to produce one
unit of output. This implies the following relationship:
(13)
where qz is quantity produced by the z-sector, and i z is labour employed in the z-sector. Each
worker S has an unskilled labour endowment of ms=(mo+ms) units 19 of good z, where mo. m
are parameters of the distribution of unskilled labour. As for employment in z, it is determined
by the mass of workers (households) from the least skilled, up to the one that is indifferent
between working in the x or in the z-sector. Denoting this cut-off worker by sx,z' we have:
19With mo=l and m=O, each household s has the same unit unskilled labour endowment and lz=sx,z'
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x
. [md
sx.z =mm
w -m),S ]
o /(W
z
rs,o' (\..1

1z = Jo

(14)

2

(15)

m o + ms JUS = mosx.z + msx.z /2

Since we allow for labour taxation, prices for the z good must not only cover the wage costs
(nonnalised to 1) but also the taxes levied on labour. Therefore:
(16)

Pz={l+t),

where Pt. is price of one unit of z.
As far as expenditure on good z is concerned, it is simply obtained as the difference between
aggregate income and total expenditure on good x. So, while aggregate supply of z is fully
detennined by the relative wage between sectors, aggregate demand is fully detennined by
equilibrium in the x-sector.

2.3. The Labour Market
Equilibrium in the labour market requires that W x adjusts to equalise effective labour units
demanded in the x-sector with effective labour units available. Demand for skills is obtained
as the mass of effective labour units required by quality development by the two finns in the
x-sector. The supply of skills is obtained as the mass of effective labour units fonning the
endowments of all the workers that choose to work in the x-sector:
d S2_[m o /(_dWx _ m)]2
s
d\S- - s
Wz
el + ell = d sds =
x.z = ---"
h
S'o'
2
2

i

(,

2)

----L

(17)

Note that skill is a homogenous, interchangeable endowment; Le. the mass of effective labour
units derived from two workers supplying each 0.1 units of skill is the same as that derived
from a single different worker supplying 0.2 units of skill. Hence each worker supplying skill
is in perfect competition with all other workers; i.e. all workers in the x-sector are wage
takers. Since x-sector finns demanding skilled labour are in competition with all z-sector
finns demanding unskilled labour (via equation (14», all x-sector finns are wage-takers.
Whereas supply is only detennined by inter-sectoral relative wages, demand for effective
labour units is detennined by optimal quality choice, which in tum depends on the wage rate
in a complex way.

2.4. Solving the Model
Solving the model necessitates the solution of four equations in four unknowns. The
unknowns are the wage rate in the x-sector, the quality levels of good x and total profits of
industry x. The four equations are the two first-order conditions for quality choice (taking into
account the Bertrand pricing rules in the x-sector), labour market equilibrium in the x-sector,
and equality between actual profits and those that are conjectured by firms in the x-sector in
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making their decisions concerning quality and prices. Equilibrium in the market for good z
obtains by Walras' law. The system is thus the following:
dn1
dUI
u1 =--"----2ws (1 + t)

(18)

(19)

(20)
System (18)-(20) is non-linear and an analytical solution is not possible. The model
behaviour is simple in some aspects and can be envisaged also without an explicit solution. It
is evident, for instance, from equation (19) that the higher average quality of the x-good at
equilibrium, the lower the supply of the z-good and the higher the wage rate in the x-sector.
Though, the working of the model is more complex in other respects, and unambiguous
relations cannot always be expected. For instance, a rising tax wedge has an ambiguous effect
on supplied qualities because a negative cost effect may be compensated by a positive demand
effect (redistributed tax revenue may generate demand from consumers that were previously
not buying). The only way to to resolve these ambiguities deriving from the non-linearity of
the model is through numerical simulations.

3. Simulations
The paper presents two groups of simulations, corresponding to the baseline model without
labour taxes (t=0), Dl, and three "policy" models, D2, D3 and D4, where a uniform 100% tax
on wage cost is applied in both industries (t=I). In D2, total tax receipts T are redistributed at
a flat rate, i.e. each households receives TIS. In D3, total tax receipts T are redistributed
proportional to wage income, i.e. each households receives the exact tax amount levied on her
(his) wage bill. In 04, all tax receipts are retained by the government. The first case (D2)
corresponds thus to a case where the government redistributes income from firms to workers
and then tax revenue from rich to poor, while the second case (D3) is a simple redistribution
from firms to workers. In all simulations, we impose uo=O.Ol, S=l, a=O.5, w z=l, mo=O.25,
m=0.75. Total profits are assumed to be distributed in proportion with workers' skills (ds).
We choose a proportional distribution of profits in order to focus on cases in which the market
appears to be uncovered at equilibrium. The same rationale underlies the choice of a
distribution of unskilled labour that is monotonically increasing in workers' skills. 2o Skill
20If the resulting equilibrium income distribution is too flat, also the poorest consumer is willing to buy one unit
of the x-good and a covered market results. Assumptions about the distributions of unskilled labour, skills and
profits are designed to avoid this case. Concentrating on the uncovered-market case allows us to analyse effects
of taxation on the quantities sold in the x-sector that would be absent with a covered market. In general, the more
unequal the distribution of skills, labour and profit shares endowments, ,the more unequal (or steep) will be the
iJlcome distribution achieved in equilibrium. A steeper income distribution will be accompanied in equilibrium by

II

density d is let to vary between 1.0 and 1.8.21 The results are summarised in a table for each
simulation.
The qualitative results are grouped into three classes. The effects of changes in the skills
endowments are presented first. Taxation effects are grouped according to whether the
negative cost effects or the positive demand effects dominate the results. All results are
reported in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix.

3.1. Effects of Population-Wide Proportional Increases in Skills
A population-wide proportional increase in skills (higher d) increases product qualities while
decreasing the wage per skill unit in the x-sector (see Table 1). The wage decrease per skill
unit almost offsets the quantity increase in skills, hence employment (in number of workers)
barely decreases in the x-sector. Consequently, there is a very small rise in employment and
production in the z-sector. This result is strictly related to the assumptions of the model
concerning technology. The earnings in the x-sector are proportional to the skills ds that
workers possess, while workers' productivity in the z-sector rises less than proportionally with
skills. At almost unchanged wages per person dw s , then, increasing proportionally the skills
endowments of workers will result in a rise in the mass of effective labour units that can be
employed in the x-sector. So, the higher average skills, the higher equilibrium average
product quality. This is a realistic feature of the model, consistent with the available evidence
relating workers' skills and product quality (Daly at al., 1985, Mason et aI., 1996).
Greater values of d entail a double effect on the wage rate in the x-sector. The first, is a direct
supply effect. The higher d, the higher the supply of skills, and then, ceteris paribus, the lower
the wage rate. The second is an indirect demand effect. Higher values of d produce higher
income and then higher demand (at given prices and qualities) for the x good. Firms have
rational conjectures about the higher consumers' income, and optimally choose to increase
both prices and quality levels, generating a higher demand for skills. This second effect is just
strong enough to almost offset the first one, resulting in a slight decrease of average wage
income per person dsw s .
While the additional skills endowment is almost fully used to upgrade qualities, the gains from
these upgrades do not go directly to skilled workers but are partially retained as increased
profits and partially passed on to consumers. While absolute prices rise with increases in the
parameter d, quality-adjusted prices fall, since cost per quality level falls. Price and profit
increases are possible, since competition is somewhat relaxed by an increase in the ratio of
qualities, i.e. increased quality differentiation. Production quantities of both quality-varieties
fall: since variable costs are constant and unchanged, cost of providing quality instead of
quantity is reduced. Total profits, aggregate income, and aggregate utility increase as d rises.
Added (real) income is generated in the form of added profits, which are distributed
proportional to skill level s, and reduced prices of quality goods, which are bought by the
high-income segment of the population. Income and utility of the lowest-skill household stay
unchanged, since they buy no quality goods and earn no share of the profits. Consequently,
income and utility dispersion increase.

less markel coverage, higher producl qualities, higher qualily differentiation, and a higher employmenl share in
the x-seclor.
21 A change in the value of d changes numerical compulalions, bUl does not aller lhe qualilalive resulls oblained
concerning labour laxation.

12

3.2. Effects of labour taxation
Labour taxation implies a redistribution from firms to households. If the tax revenue is
redistributed at a flat rate, a redistribution from rich to poor households is added. In general,
income is expected to be distributed more equally, at equilibrium, once taxation is introduced.
Higher firms' costs due to the fiscal wedge on wages would lead, holding other conditions
fixed, to lower profits, lower product qualities (see equations (18» and, then, to lower demand
for skills in the x-sector. Taxation, though, also increases households' revenues, and then
finns' demand, with positive consequences for profits, product qualities, and for the wage rate
in the x industry. The qualitative net effect of taxation crucially depends on the
redistributional effects on income of the tax policy rule applied, while it is only insignificantly
affected by the average level of skills endowment of the economy.

3.2.1. Cost effects oflabour taxes prevailing.

This scenario occurs for high taxation and no (or low) redistribution of tax revenues,
represented by simulations D4 (see Table 2). Qualities, employment and profits in the x-sector
decrease due to taxation, while employment and production in the z-sector increase. Labour
taxation entails a reduction in demand for skills in the x-sector, which is reflected in a lower
value for ws ' This decrease in ws ' however, is not nearly large enough to offset the tax cost
increase, so, a tax wedge that increases labour costs leads to an increase in the gross wage
rate but a slight reduction in the net wage rate for high-skilled workers. Income (weakly)falls
for everybody in the economy, but higher skilled households take higher losses since profits
decrease substantially. Due to this redistributional effect of taxation, income inequality falls,
which in tum leads to increased sales ofquality-goods to lower income households. However,
this positive income effect on demand for the x-industry is not sufficient to outweigh the
negative cost effect due to taxation. Hence, quality-adjusted prices must fall in spite of quality
reductions. Aggregate firms' profits fall, and also the utility of consumers (formerly) buying
quality-goods falls due to reduced quality. Even low-income households not buying qualitygoods lose in welfare terms, since taxation leads to price increases in the z-sector not
compensated by tax redistribution. As a result, aggregate utility falls. So, labour taxation

faces a trade-off between income inequality and aggregate utility, taken as a (utilitarian)
welfare indicator.

3.2.2. Demand effects oflabour taxes prevailing.

This scenario occurs in all cases where tax revenues are fully redistributed, represented by
simulations D2 and D3 (see Table 2). Qualities, employment and profits in the x-sector
increase, while employment and production in the z-sector decrease. Due to the redistribution
effect of taxation, income inequality falls, leading to increased sales of quality-goods to lower
income households. The positive income effect on demand of the x-industry appears to be
strong, strong enough to increase equilibrium qualities. This is reflected in increased demand
for skills in the x-sector, and then in a higher wage for workers employed in the x-industry.
Counterintuitively, then, a tax-wedge that increases labour costs leads in this case the net wage
rate for high-skilled workers to rise. Quality-adjusted prices rise, to offset taxation-induced
cost effects. Firms' profits, aggregate income and utility rise, so that labour taxation in this
case not only reduces income inequality, but also increases the value of our welfare indicator.
Low-income households not buying quality-goods, weakly gain in welfare terms, because the
price increase in the z-sector is compensated by income increases due to tax redistribution.
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When the tax revenue is redistributed proportional to income (case D3), inequality falls less
sharply after taxation and the rise in profits and income are of a lower magnitude (relative to
the initial tax increase). Higher income inequality in case D3 is directly related to the rule of
redistribution (indirect redistribution from rich to poor is absent in case D3). The different
results with respect to profits and income are less intuitive, and are associated with a different
impact of redistribution on demand for the x-good. There are two effects at play here. On one
hand, the more equidistributed is the tax revenue, the higher the number of households that
start buying from the x-sector (the higher the extent of market-coverage), and then the higher
demand for the x-good, equilibrium profits, qualities and income. This effect is more prevalent
in Case D2. On the other hand, the effects of additional demand for the x-industry generated
by a given tax are stronger if the tax revenue is not too much dispersed across the population.
Higher tax revenue for households endowed with higher skills would indeed concentrate
demand in the high-income segment of the population, which is the one that buys from the xsector. This second redistributive effect leads to quality upgrading in the simulations. It is
dominant in Case D3.

4. Conclusions
High labour costs are often associated with a poor perfonnance of industrial firms, and then
with low industry demand, profits and employment. In this paper we develop a simple general
equilibrium model to analyse this presumed trade-off between labour costs and firms'
profitability. The model considers a vertically differentiated oligopolistic industry, where
firms compete both in prices and in the quality level of their products. This captures basic
features of advanced industrial sectors, where R&D, advertisement and product development
are important dimensions along which competition is evolving. The general equilibrium
structure of the model allows to build a link between product quality and factor endowments
that is missing in partial equilibrium models with imperfect competition. Consistently with
empirical evidence, we assume that higher product quality requires the employment of a
higher amount of skilled labour. In the model, we distinguish between wages and labour taxes
as different components of labour costs. So, there is one component (the wage rate) that is
endogenous to the model, and another (taxes) that is a policy variable.
Solving the model through simulations we show, first, that an increase in skills endowment
hardly changes employment patterns (in tenns of workers employed) though effective skill
use in the imperfectly competitive industry increases. The additional skills endowment is used
for quality upgrades. The gains from these upgrades are partially passed on to consumers
through decreases in price per quality. Consequently, employment and production in the
perfectly competitive sector hardly changes. Second we show, that the effect of taxation
crucially depends on its redistributive consequences. With taxation, income inequality is
generally reduced, even if tax revenues are retained by the government in full. When fully
redistributed to households, taxes can lead to quality increases of varieties produced in the
imperfectly competitive sector due to their effect of increasing income and demand. This
income effect is the stronger the more redistributive the tax scheme. When taxes are retained
by the government in full, cost effects dominate and income and welfare falls. When taxes are
fully redistributed at a flat rate per household, demand effects dominate and income and
welfare rises.
The model is oversimplified and the robustness properties of our results with respect to
different model specifications have not yet been established, so that our exercise cannot safely
be taken as a guide for policy analysis. We believe, though, that some lessons can be learnt
even by our simple exercise. First, it shows fonnally that neglecting general equilibrium
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effects when studying the relation between labour costs and industry performance may have
relevant consequences for policy prescriptions. Second, it shows that changes in factor
endowments or relative factor prices affect the nature of internal competition in imperfectly
competitive industries. This in tum leads to additional effects beyond those that can be
inferred from using a Heckscher-Ohlin or Specific-Factor framework of analysis. Several
specific predictions about changes in re ative wages, market shares, demand and prices may be
investigated further in empirical research.
We believe that the real potential of this modelling framework lies in applications to trade
issues. The incorporation of a quality-differentiated goods sector allows for the analysis of
vertical intra-industry trade within a general-equilibrium trade framework. For example, the
effects of trade-opening on domestic profits in the imperfectly-competitive sector will depend
on where the domestic industry ends up being situated on the international quality ladder. In
this context, changes in labour taxation will have a strategic trade policy effect that can be
studied using our model.
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Appendix: A GE-Model with Duopolistic X-Industry: Simulation Results
List of Variables
Variable
d
t
ws
uh
ul
qh
ql
qz
ph
pi
Pih
Pil
ix
UO
US
Ut
sz
sxl
sxl

T
Pim
pz
ruhl
rohl
puh
pul
Yt
YO
YS
Yinequ
UtInequ

skills scaling parameter, average skill level is d S/2
tax rate on wage costs
skills wage in x-sector, per effective labour unit s
Iquality of the high-qualitv good
Iquality of the low-quality good
Iquantity of the high-quality good
Iquantity of the low-quality good
Ilquantity of good z, equals Iz
Iprice of the high-quality good
Iprice of the low-quality good
Iprofit of the high-quality finn
Iprofit of the lOW-Quality finn
total effective labour units used in industry x, equals (S"2-lz"2)12
utility of household s=O
utility of household s=S
aggregate utilty
highest wage-earner s employed in the z-sector
lowest consumer s buying low quality, equals S-qh
I lowest consumer s buying high quality, equals S-qh-QI
total tax revenue, equals t (Iz wz + ix ws)
'total profits in the x-sector, equals (Pih + Pil)
price of good z
ratio of qualities uh/ul
ratio of prices ph/pi
Iprice/qualty ratio for h: iPh/uh
price/quality ratio for I: pUul
aggregate income
income of household s=O
income of household s=S
ratio of incomes of household Sand 0, equals YSIYI
ratio of utilities of household Sand 0, equals USIUI
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Appendix: A GE-Model with Duopolistic X-Industry: Simulation Results
(Legend: see List of Variables)

Table 1 • Cases withVarying Skills Endowments

d
Variable
ws
uh
ul
Iqh
Iql
Iqz Iph
Ipi
Pih
Pil
ix
UO
US
Ut
dws
sz
sxl
sxh
T
Pim
Ipz
ruhI
Irphl
Ipuh
loul
Yt
YO
YS
Yinequ
UtInequ

1

Case Dl: No Taxation
1.3
1.5

1.8

(1.8)-(1)%

0.675164
0.562427
0.261685
0.282933
0.0502007 0.0529568
0.592475
0.590907
0.296237
0.295454
0.577373
0.578691
0.899921
0.916718
0.389555
0.399181
0.486946
0.496672
0.113699
0.116362
0.0709998 0.0828553
0.05
0.05
0.597516
0.622234
0.303915
0.314274
1.012746
1.0123686
0.95148927 0.95285793
0.111288
0.113639
0.407525
0.409093
0
0
0.600645
0.613034
1
t
3.43894759 3.2400533
7.75995155 7.53786105
3.43894759 3.2400533
7.75995155 7.53786105
1.2259554 1.23832522
0.25
0.25
2.214036 2.2384366
8.856144 8.9537464
11.95032
12.44468

-44.51%
28.74%
19.11%
-0.87%
-0.87%
0.75%
6.37%
8.54%
6.86%
8.12%
64.80%
0.00%
14.00%
11.41%
-0.12%
0.47%
7.39%
1.29%

I

1.0136
0.219772
0.04446
0.596119
0.298059
0.574391
0.861812
0.367789
0.464785
0.107619
0.0502763
0.05
0.545823
0.282095
1.0136
0.94840668
0.105822
0.403881
0
0.572404,
1
3.92139126
8.27235717
3.92139126
8.27235717
1.19774096
0.25
2.158408
8.633632
10.91646

0.779266
0.246088
0.0481145
0.593736
0.296868
0.576328
0.886587
0.381928
0.479206
0.111578
0.0628744
0.05
0.578766
0.296026
1.0130458
0.95040483
0.109396
0.406264
0
0.590784
1
3.60272342
7.93789814
3.60272342
7.93789814
1.21610829
0.25
2.1946138
8.7784552
11.57532

7.10%
0.00%
8.08%
-1.99%
-17.37%
-8.88%
3.39%
0.00%
3.71%
3.71%
14.00%
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Appendix: A GE-Model with Duopolistic X-Industry: Simulation Results
(Legend: see List of Variables)

Table 2 - Cases with Different Taxation Schemes (d=l for all cases)

Flat Redistribution
Case

D2-Dl(%)

02

t

0.2

Proportional Redistrib.

No Redistribution

D3

1D4

03-01(%)
1

04-01(%)
1

Variable

ws
uh
ul
qh
ql
qz
ph
pI

Pih
Pil
ix
UO
US
Ut
dws
sz
sxl
sxh
T

Pim
pz
ruhl
rphl
puh
pul
Yt
YO
YS
Yinequ
Utlnequ

!

1.01611
0.237679
0.0469659
0.618459
0.30923
0.565845
1.016
0.436444
0.559471
0.132272
0.0586972
0.055909
0.558026
0.295699
1.01611
0.93946113
0.072311
0.381541
0.12509756
0.691743
1.2,
5.06067168!
2.327904611
4.27467298
9.29278477
1.44233772
0.37509756
2.52469356
6.73076505
9.98096907

0.25%
1.02431
8.15%
0.286085
5.64%
0.0533579
3.75%
0.596798
3.75%
0.298399
-1.49%
0.539327
17.89%
1.70034
18.67%
0.741011
20.37%
0.84709
22.91 %
0.215284
16.75%
0.0846918
11.82%
0.05
2.24%
0.605073
4.82%
0.306543
0.25%
1.02431
-0.94% 0.91137764
-31.67%
0.104803
-5.53%
0.403202,
0.62607766
20.85%
1.062374
20.00%
2
2.38% 5.36162405
-0.65% 2.29462181
9.01% 5.94347834
12.34% 13.8875593 ;
20.42%
2.314533 :
50.04%
0.5
16.97%
4.173368
-22.04%
8.346736
-8.57%
12.10146

1.06%
1.01271
30.17%
0.212894
20.01%
0.0434744
0.11%
0.604055
0.11%
0.302028
-6.10%
0.577494
97.30%
0.78386
101.48%
0.333604
82.25%
0.381695
100.04%
0.0969296
68.45%
0.0472137
0.00%
0.0353553
10.86%
0.363575
8.67%
0.190319
1.06%
1.0127~
-3.90% 0.95161966
-0.96%
0.093917
-0.17%
0.395945
0.62530779
85.60%
0.4786246
100.00%
2
8.47% 4.89699685
-2.07% 2.34967207
51.57% 3.68192622
67.88% 7.67357341
93.24% 1.10392865
100.00%
0.25
93.35%
1.9699592
-3.32%
7.8798368
10.86% 10.2834653

-0.09%
-3.13%
-2.22%
1.33%
1.33%
0.54%
-9.05%
-9.29%
-17.88%
-9.93%
-6.09%
-29.29%
-33.39%
-32.53%
-0.09%
0.34%
-11.25%
-1.96%
-16.38%
100.00%
-0.93%
0.28%
-6.11 %
-7.24%
-7.83%
0.00%
-8.73%
-8.73%
-5.80%
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